This paper aims at providing an account of legal acts that forms a suitable starting point for the creation of computational systems that deal with legal acts. The paper is divided into two parts.
Introduction
In the law, legal acts (juridical acts, legal transactions, acts-in-the-law, Rechtsgeschäfte, actes juridiques) play a central role. 2 The concept of a legal act applies to phenomena in different legal systems, even in systems where the expression 'legal act' is not part and parcel of the conceptual tool kit of every lawyer. Legal acts, such as entering into, or terminating a contract, making a last will, transferring a property right, making a statute, granting a license, and passing a verdict, are familiar phenomena in the law of both the common law and
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In the formalization of examples, it was often necessary to choose whether a conditional should be formalized as a rule or as a material conditional. I have strived to formalize those conditionals as rules of which it could with some plausibility be assumed that they might represent rules of a particular legal system. Material conditionals were used for the expression of conditional connections which are on the meta-level, or did otherwise not represent a legal rule. Sometimes it was not easy to make this choice, and therefore arguably sometimes rule formulations might be replaced by material conditionals or the other way round. Not much of the argument hinges upon this, however.
To enhance the readability of this paper for readers who are not interested in formalization, the parts which contain substantial formalisms have been placed in separate sections (sections 5 and 6 of this part, and section 15 of the second part). As a consequence, some subjects are dealt with twice, one time informally and a second time formally, but real repetition has been avoided as much as possible.
Two perspectives
There are at least two ways to look at the law and to the operation of legal rules.
One way is to see the law as a discursive (argumentative) practice. The other way it to see the law as a set of special facts, as a 'world of law'. In legal practice, both views are used. The very idea of a legal act presupposes the latter way of looking at the law, a way that assigns a central place to the 'world of law'.
LAW AS A DISCURSIVE PRACTICE
Looking from the perspective of law as a discursive practice, the facts of the law, such as the facts that Barack Obama is the president of the USA, that Jones sold Smith his real estate, or that the legislature yesterday passed a general prohibition on smoking, are not out there to be discovered, as one can discover a mountain, or the phone number of a person. Legal facts are constructed by means of arguments, and they are there because they are the outcomes of good legal arguments, actual or merely hypothetical. Proponents of different legal standpoints may offer arguments with incompatible outcomes. The best of these arguments determine the contents of the law, and not the other way round.
others take her to be the leader too and because they believe that the other members have the same beliefs. 4 Some rules exist as legal rules because sufficiently many people that participate in a legal system accept these rules as legal rules and believe that others do the same. In modern societies, however, most legal rules derive their existence and status as legal rules from being made in accordance with rules that specify how to make legal rules. They exemplify a second way in which things and facts in social reality can obtain, namely through the operation of rules, including legal rules. Rules deal with how people should behave towards each other, but also with the proper use of language, with the definitions of games, and with the membership of socially defined sets, such as the set of legal rules. If the conditions of these rules are satisfied, their consequences hold in social reality.
The part of social reality that is the result of the application of rules is called the institutionalized part of social reality. Typical phenomena within the institutionalized part of social reality (or the social world) are the existence of money, of promises, of the law and of everything created through the law, such as officials, legally defined organizations and most legal rules. Let us call the mode of existence in the institutionalized part of the social world existence as institutional entity or fact. (Searle 1995, 27-29) THE WORLD OF LAW On the view of law as institutional fact, the world of law is part of the social world. In fact, most of the world of law belongs to the institutionalized part of the social world. (Hart 1997, 77-96; MacCormick and Weinberger 1986) This part of the world of law is based on the operation of legal rules.
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Given the view of law as institutional fact, legal arguments do not determine the contents of the law; they are meant to discover what the facts of law are, just as arguments can be used to find out things about the natural world.
For instance, a person already has a right to compensation for damages, because this is a fact in the world of law and legal reasoning is meant to find this out.
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As Torben Spaak kindly pointed out, there are more related analyses of this mode of existence, such as the one offered in Lagerspetz 1995. 5 However, not all of the world of law belongs to the institutionalized part of social reality. Rules of customary law, for instance, belong to the world of law because they are broadly accepted as rules of law. In this paper, the non-institutionalized part of the world of law will mainly be ignored, because it is only marginally relevant for legal acts.
The doctrinal notion of a legal act
Any discussion of legal acts runs the risk of being burdened by an ambiguity.
Sometimes the notion of a legal act is an internal legal concept, used in the rules of a particular legal system. This is for instance the case in the Netherlands, where there are rules that specify under which circumstances a legal act comes about. (art. 3:32-37 BW) It is also possible, however, to abstract from the way in which a particular legal system deals with legal acts and to develop a general notion of a legal act which can be used to characterize legal systems and which makes it, for instance, possible to ask whether a particular system recognizes legal acts and which phenomena are in this system dealt with as legal acts. This more abstract notion will be called the doctrinal notion of a legal act, because this notion was developed in legal doctrine. 6 It will be discussed later in this section, but let us first have a closer look at the role of the internal legal concept of a legal act.
INTERMEDIATE LEGAL CONCEPTS
Many facts in the world of law do not have any physical counterpart. An example would be the fact that Smith owns the farm Blackacre. For some, in particular the so-called 'Scandinavian realists' (Ross 1957 ; Olivecrona 1971, 135-185) this lack of physical reference has meant that words like 'own ', or 'ownership' or 'right' are meaningless, because, since they lack physical reference, they would lack any reference. A more adequate interpretation of these words is that they represent a particular legal status, such as that of 'owner', of 'president', or of 'suspect'. The role of such a status is to function as intermediary in legal arguments (Ross 1957; Lindahl and Odelstad 1999) , and -on a reifying interpretation -as a kind of intermediary facts in the world of law. (Brouwer and Hage 2006) Let us take ownership as an example. The law knows several ways to obtain ownership, such as creation of a good, inheritance, or transfer of the right.
Moreover, the law attaches many legal consequences to being an owner, such as 6 Although the internal legal notion and the doctrinal notion of a legal act are different things, they have influenced each other. The doctrinal notion was developed through abstracting from different forms of legal acts as used in the legal rules, while the rules have been adapted to the notion as it was developed in legal doctrine.
the duty for everybody except the owner not to destroy the owned good, and the competence of the owner to transfer the ownership, or to create a limited right (e.g. mortgage) with respect to the owned object.
In theory, the legal consequences of ownership might be attached directly to all the different ways in which ownership can be acquired. It is more economical, however, to work with an intermediate category -the category of ownership -that forms the intermediary between the rules that specify under which circumstances particular legal consequences obtain, and the rules that specify which legal consequences obtain if the conditions of the former rules are satisfied. (Ross 1957) If there are three ways to acquire ownership and four legal consequences are attached to ownership, a legal system that uses the category of ownership, needs seven (three plus four) rules to regulate this subject (see Figure 2) . A legal system recognizes a particular institution, for instance ownership, if it has three kinds of rules: cannot be based on the rules of a particular legal system. To answer this question, we will turn to the theory of speech acts.
LEGAL ACTS AS SPEECH ACTS
In an early paper, Searle (1979) the kind of speech which is performed about this propositional content. For instance, the sentence 'There is a big dog over there' has the propositional content that there is a big dog over there. Depending on the circumstances of utterance, it may be a pure factual description of the situation (illocutionary force 1) or a warning (illocutionary force 2) that there is danger ahead.
The direction of fit as exposed by Searle holds between the propositional content of a speech act and the world. The illocutionary force of a speech act determines which direction of fit is involved. Searle distinguished five main kinds of speech acts: assertives, directives, commisives, declarations and expressives.
For the present purposes, only the distinction between assertives and declarations is relevant. Assertives commit the speaker to something's being the case. For instance, the sentence 'It's raining' can be used for an assertive speech act.
Assertives have the word-to-world direction of fit; they are successful if they are true.
Declarations bring about a correspondence between the speech act's propositional content and the world. The second amendment concerns the direction of fit of constitutives.
According to Searle constitutives have a double direction of fit, because the world is altered to fit the propositional content of the speech act by representing the world as being so altered (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 53) . The expression 'double direction of fit' is somewhat misleading, however, because it suggests that both directions are equally important. If somebody copies the file which contains the text of this paper, his file comes to be identical to mine, and mine comes to be identical to his. However, his copy of the file comes to be identical to my copy in a more basic sense than the other way round, because his copy of the file is adapted to my copy and not the other way round. Approximately the same holds for the double direction of fit: the words come to fit the world only because the world has been adapted to the words. Therefore constitutives will be taken as having the world-to-word direction of fit.
This analysis of constitutives very much and not coincidentally (Searle 2010 , 28/9) resembles the picture sketched by MacCormick of institutional legal facts. Constitutives are the means by which institutional legal facts are created, and the institutive, (terminative) and consequential rules mentioned by MacCormick are precisely the background which form the abstract institution and which makes the performance of constitutive acts possible.
The next step it to apply this unified picture of institutional theory of law and speech act theory to legal acts. A legal act is then a kind of speech act by means of which a change is brought about in the world of law. The propositional content of the speech act determines which changes will be brought about if the speech act is valid. By the way: the speech act needs not be a real speech act. All that is necessary is that there is an act with a propositional content and that the law attaches to the performance of this act the consequences which are specified in the propositional content of the act.
There is another aspect of legal acts which has received ample attention in doctrinal legal writings 9 and is not so much emphasized by Searle's theory of speech acts and that is that the change brought about by a legal act must be intentional. This leads us to the following doctrinal characterization of a legal act:
A legal act is an act with a propositional content, performed with the intention to bring about the change in the world of law that is indicated by means of the propositional content.

A legal system recognizes legal acts if it has rules that specify how a legal act is to be performed and that attach by and large the intended consequences to the valid performance of the legal act for the reason that they were intended.
Legal acts on this definition will be the subject of more detailed analysis in the sections 7 to 14. This analysis will be based on a conceptual framework about entities, facts and rules, and it is to this framework that we will turn now.
Rules
The world of law in a broad sense consists of everything the existence of which is based on the application of legal rules. This includes real estate, mayors, cars, but also certain kinds of events, acts, states of affairs and rules.
ENTITIES
In predicate logic it is customary to distinguish between full sentences, which
have truth values, and terms and function expressions, which denote so-called 'individuals'. For instance, 'John' would be a term, which presumably denotes a man, while 'John whistles' is a sentence which has a truth value, but does not, as a whole, denote anything (pace Frege). Because 'individuals' suggests that persons are involved, while the logical use of this term is much broader, we will use the term 'entity' instead of it. So, entities are what is denoted by terms and by function expressions. Both the numeral '2' and the function expression '2 2 ' denote entities, namely respectively the numbers two and four.
FACTS AND STATES OF AFFAIRS
States of affairs are by definition everything which is expressed by a declarative sentence, such as the state of affairs that Paris is the capital of China and the state of affairs that Beijing is the capital of China. 10 The former of these states of affairs does not obtain and is therefore a non-fact. The latter does obtain, and is for that reason also a fact.
States of affairs are considered a kind of entities, which may be somewhat weird in the eyes of many logicians because they are expressed by full sentences.
However, the introduction of states of affairs as entities both conform to standard linguistic usage (people talk about states of affairs) and has many advantages for 9 This is very obvious in those writings which expose the so-called 'will theory' of legal acts. See for instance Flume 1979, 7 and Fried 1981. 10 The sentence expresses a state of affairs, but does not denote it, because full sentences do not denote.
the representation of knowledge domains, especially those which involve rules and their operation.
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States of affairs are either abstract or concrete. An abstract state of affairs can be realized (instantiated) in different ways. For instance, the abstract state of affairs that it is raining can be realized at different times and places. Whereas states of affairs can be either abstract or concrete, facts, states of affairs which actually obtain, are always concrete.
Facts obtain at a particular moment, and this moment is assumed to be part of the fact description. So the fact would not be that it rains, but that it rains a time t.
RULES
Rules are a kind of entities, like tables, chairs and prime numbers. They are immaterial, like prime numbers, but exist in time, like tables and chairs. They consist of a condition part and a conclusion part, which are both abstract states of affairs. The point of rules is that if their conditions are satisfied, that is, if an instantiation of the abstract state of affairs which forms its conclusion, obtains, their conclusions obtain.
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The world of law is subject to change. Part of this change consists of events that take place in the 'ordinary' world and which count as changes in the world of law. For instance, if a person P becomes 18, this event counts as becoming of age in the world of law. Another part of the changes is brought about by rules which attach new facts to existing ones. If a person is of age, he has the capacity to perform legal acts. As a consequence, if P becomes 18, he does not only become of age, but also receives the capacity to perform legal acts.
As these examples illustrate, the operation of rules is crucially important for understanding the dynamics of the world of law. We will therefore go into some detail about the kinds of rules and their modes of operation. The rules that constrain the world of the law can be divided into dynamic rules and static 11 More details on the treatment of states of affairs as entities can be found in Hage 1997: 131f and Hage 2005a: 72f. 12 Although adequate logical models of the legal domain are not well possible without non-monotonic logics (Hage 2003 ; but see also Dynamic rules may be conditional, in which case the legal consequence is only attached to the event under certain conditions. An example is the rule that if it is dark, the occurrence of a car accident obligates the drivers to place a warning triangle on the road next to the cars.
The operation of dynamic rules is depicted in Figure 4 : Figure 4 The horizontal arrow indicates a connection in time: the legal consequence (or:
legal effect) occurs after the event took place. Obviously, an event may have more than one legal consequence. Not all legal rules attach legal consequences to an event, with the effect that the consequences come to obtain after the event took place. There are also rules which attach the presence of a fact to the presence of another fact. An example is the rule which attaches the fact that a person is competent to alienate an object to the fact that this person owns that object. Because the operation of these rules does not involve changes over time, such rules will be called static rules.
Static rules may be conditional too. An example is the rule that in case of emergencies, the mayor of a city is competent to evoke the state of emergency.
This rule conditionally attaches the fact that some person has a competence to the fact that this person is the mayor.
Actually there are two types of static rules. In the next subsection we will consider the so-called 'counts-as rules'. First we will have a closer look at those static rules which attach new facts to existing ones, and which we will call fact tot fact rules. The example about the mayor who is competent to evoke the state of emergency is an example of such a fact tot fact rule. The operation of fact tot fact rules is depicted as follows: That the arrows points downwards indicates that the relation between the two facts is timeless.
COUNTS-AS RULES
The 16 Counts-as rules have become quite popular in the recent literature, due to the influence of Searle (1995) . In the jurisprudential literature, counts-as rules have for a long time been known under the name of rules of recognition (Hart 1994) . As Spaak points out (Spaak 1994: 167-169) , these rules were also familiar in the Scandinavian literature as 'norms of qualification'.
The operation of counts-as rules can be depicted as in Figure 6 :
The vertical arrow indicates again that the relation between entity 1 and entity 2 is timeless. The entities are indicated by means of circles, but ovals (for events), or rectangles (for states of affairs) would also have been possible.
DYNAMIC AND FACT TO FACT RULES
To gain a proper understanding of the roles which the different kinds of rules play in the constitution of the world of law, it is important to study how these rules interact with each other. We will therefore consider an extended example. 18 The horizontal line from the box that represents the fact that the rule is valid to the downward arrow that represents the a-temporal relation between the fact that X is the mayor to the fact that X is competent means that the a-temporal relation is based on the static rule whose validity is represented by the box. 
Logic
In the previous sections we have seen an informal analytical account of the 'world of law' and in particular of the role that rules play in this world. To make this account more precise and to facilitate the use of it in legal knowledge representation, this section provides the necessary logical tools.
The language L
The tools consist mainly in an extension of the language of first order predicate logic, called L. The extension consists in a number of dedicated predicates, relations, and function expressions and some conventions. 
BASICS
The first convention concern a specification of the language for predicate logic that will be used:
-All constants for relations, predicates, and sentences without a subjectpredicate structure start with an uppercase letter.
-All function expressions, individual constants and variables start with a lowercase letter, except individual constants and variables denoting states of affairs, which start with an asterisk (*), followed by a lowercase letter.
-The constants , , ~, &, , and stand for the universal and the existential quantifier, negation, conjunction, inclusive disjunction, the material conditional and equivalence, respectively.
-To prevent long sequences of universal quantifiers, we will sometimes use the convention that all free variables in a sentence are assumed to be bound by a universal quantifier.
-Variables are italicized.
-All formula's will be written in a special typescript.
STATES OF AFFAIRS
The second convention concerns states of affairs, which are treated as entities. If
S is a sentence, and if s is the string that results if all the uppercase letters at the beginnings of the atomic sentences that are part of S are replaced by lowercase sentences, then *s typically denotes the state of affairs expressed by S.
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Variables for states of affairs start with an asterisk too. For instance, the following sentence expresses that Jane believes everything that John believes 21 :
Believes(john, *s) Believes(jane, *s) the presupposed logical background is that of deductive logic. The reasons for not choosing a nonmonotonic logic are first that the theory of legal acts presupposes a reified view of the world of law, instead of legal constructivism, while defeasible reasoning fits best with legal constructivism. And second, the use of a non-monotonic logic would add logical complications which might detract from the main messages of this paper. All of this does not subtract from it that a future extension of the present work might have to use a non-monotonic logic as background logic. 20 Because states of affairs are from a logical point of view individuals (or entities), they may be denoted by other expressions too, including proper names and function expressions. To distinguish between these other terms and the conventional term *s, the latter is said to denote the state of affairs expressed by S typically. 21 To limit the complexity of sentences, we will use the convention that all open sentences are assumed to be closed under universal quantification over all free variables. Notice that this does not apply to rule formulations, because these do not contain full sentences. 
RULES
In L rules are treated as entities, denoted by a function expression which has the rule conditions and the rule conclusion as its parameters. (Something like: the rule with conditions a and conclusion b.) L employs to this purpose a dedicated function constant that has rules as its values: /2. Both the first parameter and the second parameters are terms denoting abstract states of affairs. The first parameter stands for the rule conditions, the second for the rule conclusion. For instance, the following term denotes the rule that thieves are punishable:
If the same free variable occurs both in the condition part and in the conclusion part of the rule, they should in case of instantiation be instantiated by the same value.
The predicate constant Valid/1 serves to express that a rule exists, orwhat boils down to the same thing -is valid. It is defined by the following sentence:
The following sentence expresses that the rule that thieves are punishable is valid:
APPLICATION OF RULES
In the present paper, the defeasibility of reasoning with rules is ignored. Then the 'logic' of rules is simple: if the conditions of a rule are satisfied under some instantiation , then the conditions of the rule are true under . So rules can be used for both modus ponens like arguments and modus tollens like arguments, but (the validity of) rules cannot be derived from the (logical) truth of the conclusion or the (logical) falsity of the conditions.
TIME
To formalize the operation of rules which involves the lapse of time, it is useful to add a time tag to sentences that represent states of affairs. For instance:
Owns(smith, blackacre) t represents the state of affairs that Smith owns
Blackacre at time t.
The lapse of time is, for the sake of easy formalization, assumed to be discrete. It t represents a moment in time, t+1 represents the next moment. If an event takes place at moment t and this event has immediate consequences, the consequences will obtain starting from moment t+1.
Semantics
Searle applied the distinction between directions of fit to gain a better understanding of speech acts. It can also be applied to illuminate the difference between descriptive sentences and rules, however. (Searle 2010, 96-100) Descriptive sentences have the word to world direction of fit, because they aim to be true in the sense of corresponding to the world. Rules, on the contrary, have the direct world to word direction of fit, because -like constitutives -they bring about that the facts in the world come to match the contents of the rule.
There are two differences:
1. constitutives operate once only, while rules impact on all states of affairs which satisfy their applicability conditions 22 ;
2. constitutives are momentary events, which take place at a particular moment in time and operate only then, while rules have an existence that stretches out in time and they have impact as long as they exist.
RULES AS CONSTRAINTS
Valid rules impose themselves on the world. They constrain the world in the sense that not all combinations of facts are possible. In this respect they differ from most descriptive sentences, which aim to indicate which facts happen to be the case within the boundaries of what is possible. The starting point for such an account of constraints is to define consistency of sentences in terms of the compatibility of the states of affairs expressed by these sentences, instead of the other way round. Descriptive sentences are called consistent if it is possible that they are all true. For instance, the sentences 'John is a thief' and 'John is a minor' are consistent, because it is possible that John is both a thief and a minor. In other words, because the states of affairs that John is a thief and that he is a minor are compatible, the sentences that express these states of affairs are consistent. The sentences 'John is a thief'
22 Exceptions to rules and analogous rule application are ignored (again). 23 I assume here that the time which a rule operates coincides with its time of existence. 24 One might argue that there are also descriptive sentences which are necessarily true, such as the sentence that circles are round. However, such sentences usually (also) express constraints on what is possible, and very often these sentences are better interpreted as formulating constraints on possible worlds than as descriptions of the facts which obtain in these worlds. See also Hage 2005a, 197-200 on the descriptive counterparts of rules. 25 For one account of this type of semantics, see Lukaszewicz 1990, 38-43. and 'John is not a thief' are inconsistent, because it is not possible that John both is and is not a thief. It is the incompatibility of the states of affairs that John is a thief and that he is not a thief that makes the corresponding sentences inconsistent.
Compatibility and incompatibility of states of affairs are taken to be ontologically prior to the consistency of the sentences expressing these states of affairs. This means that the compatibility of states of affairs cannot be derived from the consistency of the sentences that express them, but that there must be another ground for the compatibility of states of affairs. This other ground is to be found in a set of constraints which disallow some combinations of states of affairs in a single world and allow the other combinations 26 Or, to state it in different words, constraints rule out some worlds as impossible, while allowing other ones as possible worlds. Two states of affairs are then compatible if there is at least one possible world in which these states of affairs both obtain. That there is such a world (if there is one) is because it is not ruled out by the constraints on possible worlds.
The states of affairs that John is a thief and that he is not a thief are incompatible because of the constraint that a state of affairs cannot both obtain
and not obtain. The world in which John both and is not a thief is for that reason impossible. A similar constraint is that the single state of affairs that John is both a thief and a minor can only obtain if both the states of affairs that John is a thief and that he is a minor obtain. Such constraints are usually called logical constraints, and they determine which worlds count as logically possible.
In traditional model-theoretic semantics, these incompatibilities are reflected as characteristics of the interpretation function that assigns truth values to sentences. The relevant characteristics in this case are that the interpretation function assigns the truth value false to the sentence ~P if and only if it assigns the truth value true to the sentence P, and that it assigns the truth value true to the sentence P&Q if and only if it assigns true to both P and Q.
Besides logical constraints, there are also other constraints. There are physical constraints that prevent somebody from being in two non-adjacent countries at the same time. It is, for instance, physically impossible that John is both in France and in Austria. Conceptual constraints make it impossible that anything is both a square and a circle. Next to the familiar logical, physical and conceptual constraints, there can also be legal constraints on possible worlds. Suppose, for instance, that in a particular legal system the rule exists that owners can transfer their property rights. In the world of the law determined by this system, which is one legally possible world, it cannot occur that somebody is both an owner and unable to transfer his property right. 27 Legal rules function as constraints on those worlds of law in which they exist (are valid).
As this example shows, the constraints on possible worlds can be the result of human culture. By adopting rules, humans can impose additional constraints on the world in which they live. Rule-based constraints are contingent in the sense that they are absent in a world in which these rules do not exist. But when they exist, they rule out certain combinations of states of affairs as impossible, and necessitate other states of affairs, just as logical and physical constraints do. Let Si be a sentence in L, and let *sa i denote the state of affairs that is typically expressed by S i . *sa i is then a state of affairs that is possible relative to L. Over the elements of every world line WL i a successor-relation is defined such that a world w' WL i is the successor of world w WL i iff the time tag t' of w' is one bigger than the time tag t of w.
There are no other constraints on the states of affairs that are elements of the worlds in W. There are, for instance, worlds in W in which the state of affairs *p & q obtains, but in which the state of affairs *q does not obtain. Such worlds are possible relative to L, but they are not logically possible.
Worlds that are logically possible are subject to a number of additional constraints. The set of these logically possible worlds is denoted by W L . These worlds, which are logically possible, must satisfy the following constraints 30 : w.
These constraints give the traditional meaning of the quantifiers, again stated in terms of states of affairs.
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A constraint that is characteristic for rules is that if the conditions of an existing (valid) rule are satisfied, the consequences of this rule obtain. Let Finally there are some constraints to guarantee that logical relations also hold between states of affairs:
30 All states of affairs are assumed to have the same time tag, which is therefore omitted. 31 To gain simplicity at the cost of precision, the formulations of the constraints 6 and 7 do not deal with compound formulas, or the use of quantifiers or function expressions within the scope of the quantifiers. 32 The references to the worlds w i and w i+n are necessary to make the constraint also applicable to dynamic rules. In the case of a dynamic rule, n will have the value 1 (the world of the legal consequence is the successor to the world of the operative event); in the case of a static rule the value of n will be 0 (the two worlds coincide). For rules with delayed legal consequences, the value of n will be bigger than 1. w, then *~Compatible(*r, *p) w.
An example
To illustrate the interplay of static and dynamic rules without having to cope with the intricacies of legal acts, we will briefly discuss an example which does not involve a legal act.
The example concerns the case in which somebody dies and somebody inherits a good and thereby receives the permission to destroy the inherited good.
This example involves two rules, one about inheritance and one about the permission of owners to destroy their goods. To keep the example simple, the rule about inheritance will be simplified strongly, to make it run that if somebody dies, the inheritor becomes the owner of everything the testator owned. The following sentence expresses that this rule is valid:
33 By replacing the logical constraints by other constraints (possibly a superset), different versions of compatibility can be expressed. The validity of the rule that the owner of a good is permitted to destroy this good can be expressed as follows:
Valid(owns(p, g) *permitted(p, destroy(g)))
where the predicate Permitted/2 stands for permitted to do. The following sentences express the relevant facts of the case: From the validity of the first rule and these facts it follows that 34 :
Owns(jane, volvo) 2011-01-04-12:05:01 And from this and the validity of the second rule it follows that Permitted(jane, destroy(volvo)) 2011-01-04-12:05:01 This example ends the first part of this paper which offers an analytical and a logical account of legal acts. In this first part, legal acts are given a place in the 'world of law'. This world of law is characterized as a part of institutional reality and its mode of operation is sketched at the hand of dynamic rules and two kinds of static rules. The first part is closed by providing some logical tools by means of which the world of law and its operation can be described, and with an illustration of how the interplay of static and dynamic rules can be represented formally by means of these tools. The second part of the paper will focus exclusively on legal acts.
